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2  Adjustment to the 
First Oil Shock: From 
Import Substitution to 
Macroeconomic Restraint 
In March  1974, when Emesto Geisel assumed the Brazilian presidency, the 
euphoria of the economic “miracle”  of the previous five years still reigned. 
Dissident voices were few and discredited. Despite the sharp rise in petroleum 
prices a few months earlier, prospects for continuing prosperity were bright. 
Spectacular growth  at  rates  in  excess  of  10 percent  aroused  visions  of 
grundezu, the attainment of Brazilian destiny on a world stage. Geisel himself 
was  the best  prepared among the  generals: a  proven  technocrat not  only 
capable of  managing  the  economy, but  also persuaded of  the need  for  a 
process of  guided political liberalization to assure lasting social tranquility. 
In August  1979, only months after taking office, President Jog0  Batista 
Figueiredo recalled AntBnio Delfim Net0 to serve again as economic czar, 
replacing Mirio Simonsen. It was the first change of  economic leadership 
during a presidential term since the military took power in  1964. Such an 
unprecedented decision signalled the increasing anxiety about the adequacy 
of  Brazilian  adjustment  to  the  first  oil  shock;  accelerating inflation  and 
slowing growth threatened. Delfim Neto, the author of the earlier “miracle,” 
promised a second. 
In this chapter, we  consider the accomplishments and deficiencies of  the 
adjustment strategy of the 1970s, leaving for the next chapter the second oil 
shock and the evolution of  altered policies in the 1980s. 
2.1  Origins of the Debt Problem 
Brazil faced the sharp rise in oil prices in October 1973 in apparently the 
best of circumstances. Growth had been extraordinary in the preceding years 
(figure  2.1),  current  annual  inflation  was  officially recorded  at  only  15 
percent,  and impressive foreign exchange reserves were a defense against 
shocks in  the  international economy. Unfortunately,  the  complete picture 
was less encouraging. 
The  main  weaknesses  of  the  economy  were  fourfold:  (1)  a  low 
savinghncome ratio, (2)  irregular export behavior, (3) an exchange rate that 
was becoming overvalued, and (4) resurgent inflation. They exposed Brazil 
to a special vulnerability to the direct and indirect effects of  the increased 
price of oil. 
Economic growth during the ‘  ‘miracle” had benefitted from accumulated 
excess capacity. Relatively low fixed investment rates and domestic savings 282  Eliana A. Cardoso and Albert Fishlow 
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Fig. 2.1  Growth rate of real output: Brazil and other large Latin debtors 
had therefore been required. Compared to an incremental capital-output ratio 
of  2.67  in  1965-70,  the average from  1971 to  1973 had been only  1.75.' 
Such good fortune could not be again anticipated. To  sustain a continuing 
annual  growth  rate  of  10  percent  implied  an  increase  in  the  ratio  of 
investment to income of about 4 percentage points, even without considering 
the implications of  the oil price increase. Such greater saving requirements 
conflicted  with  the  prevailing  incentives  toward  consumer  durables  as  a 
motivating force in industrial development. 
Nor  were  the  impressive international reserves  at  the  end  of  1973 an 
accurate measure of  the strength of  the balance of  payments.  Real import 
elasticities had been on the order of two since the late 1960s: growth at a rate 
of  10 percent a year implied expansion of real imports at 20 percent. Real 
export  growth  in  the  same interval was  only  about  half  as  fast  and  only 
especially rapid in 1972 and  1973. The difference was made up principally 
by improved terms of trade. Between 1969 and 1972, Brazilian export prices 
rose 23 percent; import prices, 3 percent.' 
These favorable circumstances kept demands for external financing within 
reasonable bounds.  The current account deficit amounted to  about only  2 
percent of  total product. Larger quantities of capital actually flowed in-this 
was the first show of  interest in  Brazil by  the Eurocurrency  market-and 
reserves  were  accumulated.  This  access  to  loans  helped  to  sustain  an 
exchange rate that had become overvalued because changes in the crawling 
peg were determined by  an underestimate of domestic inflation. 
Inflation was in fact on the rise. After several years of decline, to  which 
high  rates  of  productivity  increase  and  lower  real  wage  increases  had 283  BraziUChapter 2 
contributed,  Brazil  was  subject  to  a  reversal  of  the  trend.  Demand  was 
strong, fueled by  real liquidity increases. An  expansionary policy was now 
confronting  bottlenecks,  and  the  response  was  increased  reliance  on 
administrative controls  to  keep  the  index  at  the  levels  forecast  by  the 
departing administration. 
Responding with varying intensity to these initial economic conditions and 
to the political objective of  restoring law in addition to enforcing order, the 
Geisel economic policy  unfolded  in  three distinct phases.  First came the 
effort  to  cool  down  the  overheated economy  through  the  application of 
orthodox monetary and  fiscal policy  in  1974. These good intentions gave 
way  by  1975-411  part because they  were only marginally effective-to  a 
more aggressive medium-term development strategy designed to accomplish 
the  dual  objective  of  sustaining  high  rates  of  growth  while  promoting 
adjustment to the oil shock. This bold strategy was soon modified in the third 
phase  after  mid-1976.  A  short-term,  stop-and-go  macroeconomic policy 
designed to keep inflation  and  external disequilibrium within  bounds  was 
superimposed  on  medium-term  import  substitution.  Increasing  capital 
inflows became the only means of  reconciling the growth and stabilization 
objectives. This uneasy  combination of  government investment,  monetary 
stringency, and larger external indebtedness characterized the remainder of 
the period to 1979. 
2.2  From Orthodoxy to Foreign Borrowing 
The initial attempt at orthodoxy in 1974 was condemned to failure on two 
counts, one economic, the other political. Fiscal and monetary restraint was 
unable  to  make  much  headway  in  the  short  term  against  accelerating 
inflation, but did provoke a slowdown in industrial activity as well as lead to 
a  major  financial  failure  (of  the  Halles Group).  Given  a  commitment to 
“corrective inflation” that deregulated administered prices, inflation in 1974 
could hardly have failed to accelerate. Generalized increases in dollar import 
prices,  part of  the oil price explosion, added to the pressure. Even where 
moderated by subsidies, import prices were passed along to domestic prices. 
Efforts to sustain relative prices did the rest. 
At the same time that economic policy made few gains in the fight against 
inflation in the absence of  further reductions of  growth, politics called for 
bold expansion. The ruling government party’s unanticipated defeat at the 
polls  in  November  1974  did  not  provide  scope  for  unpopular  austerity 
measures. By early 1975 the die was cast for resumed expansion. Brazil was 
to  be  an  “isle  of  tranquillity”  in  the  midst  of  international  economic 
turbulence. 
The  choice  was  feasible  for  two  reasons.  First,  higher  inflation  was 
tolerable  domestically  because  of  widespread  indexing.  And,  second,  a 
much weaker external payments position because of  increased oil  imports 284  Eliana A. Cardoso and Albert Fishlow 
did not need to deter Brazilian growth; more liberal international finance was 
then available owing to petro-dollar recycling. Brazil had already discovered 
during 1974 that the old, preeoil crisis financial rules no longer held. A trade 
deficit of  $6.2 billion  was  financed  with  the  use  of  less than  $1 billion  in 
reserves. The sudden increase in capital inflows brought the gross debt level 
to  more  than  $17 billion,  with  exports less  than  half  as  large.  The debt 
strategy, although initially  unplanned, had begun in earnest. 
Few  voiced  concern. Instead, foreign  financing  increasingly  became  an 
instrument of choice satisfying three objectives. First, it dampened domestic 
inflationary pressures inherited from 1973. It did so not only by augmenting 
the supply of  imported inputs in  1974 but also by  allowing the government 
the luxury of not raising  domestic prices of imports, and especially of fuel, 
to the full extent that might have been anticipated. There was no imperative 
to cut back on consumption of energy or on other imports if the greater cost 
could be covered by borrowing.  Only gasoline prices  went up substantially, 
and even this rise was well below the percentage increase in the world price 
of  oil. 
Second, abundant and relatively cheap imports helped to sustain high rates 
of fixed investment by providing access to needed equipment and intermediate 
inputs.  Although  the  rate  of  industrial  growth  declined  throughout  the 
calendar  year,  the  principal  sectors  affected  were  automobiles  and  other 
consumer  goods.  The  producer  goods  sectors  retained  their  dynamism, 
averting more serious deceleration in aggregate industrial growth and assuring 
a basis for the eventual resumption of  rapid expansion. 
Third, access to foreign saving resolved the dilemma of inadequate finance 
for high growth rates, now that excess capacity had been used up. Ambitious 
growth targets could be compatible with continuing increases in consumption 
and  did  not  require  large  increases  in  domestic  saving.  On  the  contrary, 
thought could be  given to  correcting the lagging consumption  standards of 
the poor by implementing a more liberal wage policy. 
2.3  External Debt As Solution 
A  full  commitment  to  external  debt  as  a  way  to  facilitate  balance  of 
payments adjustment and to finance growth progressively became the basis of 
the Geisel development  strategy.  This reliance  was enshrined in the imple- 
mentation, if not the formulation, of the Second National Development Plan. 
The strategy was based on stimulating public investment and import substi- 
tution while relying on debt to avert the need for changes in relative prices or 
reductions in aggregate expenditures. The deterioration in the terms of trade 
that threatened ambitious Brazilian growth targets would be neutralized. 
An orthodox  response  to the  rise  in  oil prices  through  changed  relative 
prices and reduced real income via real devaluation,  was resisted for several 
reasons. For one, reliance on devaluation presumed significant price respon- 285  BrazilKhapter 2 
siveness of imports and exports. Many Brazilian policymakers  had  limited 
confidence  in  the  absorptive  capacity  of  the  world  market,  particularly 
during international  recession;  after all, even during the  “miracle”  years, 
exports had not performed all that well. At the time it was also believed that 
imports,  particularly  oil,  had  very  low  elasticities  of  substitution.  In 
addition,  it was certain that indexing would  convert these ineffective price 
changes into generalized inflation through widely ramified nominal rcsponscs 
of  wages  and  other  inputs.  Other  parts  of  a  conventional  adjustment 
package,  higher  interest  rates  and  rationed  credit,  would  merely  penalize 
production  and investment without eliciting more saving. 
There was  some truth  to  such  a  view.  Yet  the  “heterodox”  Brazilian 
response  to  the  oil  crisis  was  itself  flawed  in  two  important dimensions. 
Ironically,  one  weakness  was  the  apparent  coherence  of  the  import- 
substitution  strategy,  which attempted  to resolve the  short-term  balance of 
payments  problem  at  the  same  time  that  it  deepened  and  extended  the 
Brazilian industrial structure. Import substitution was too import intensive to 
work  in  the  short run  as  an  effective  policy  to  ameliorate  the  balance  of 
payments problem.  As formulated in the development plan, moreover, with 
very large-scale projects requiring significant initial investment, this generic 
defect of  the import-substitution  approach was further exaggerated. 
Import substitution can only alleviate balance of payments problems in the 
short run when there is significant excess capacity to be exploited. Brazilian 
reality was otherwise.  Brazil entered 1974 with the highest level of capacity 
utilization in the  entire postwar  period.  In  addition,  the development  plan 
called  for  moving  into  entirely  new  sectors,  not just  expanding  domestic 
share  in  established  industries.  Therefore, as  was  also  true  in  the  1950s, 
import substitution could only be pursued with the aid of  external capital. 
There was  a  second  contradiction  in the  strategy.  It  anticipated  both  a 
strong  public  sector  and  constructive  relations  with  the  private  national 
sector,  neither  of  which  was  borne  out in  reality.  Public  sector expansion 
entailed increasing deficit finance and came to rely on external resources to 
fill the  gap. The state became  larger but also economically  weaker.  At the 
same time,  state  enterprises  increasingly  impinged  upon  private  terrain, 
requiring  larger  subsidies  to  national  entrepreneurs  to  mollify  their 
opposition. These transfers came at the expense of further imbalance. Thus, 
facilitated  by  privileged  access  to  large  capital  inflows  from  abroad, 
government deficits-fiscal  and monetary-steadily  increased. 
In sum, Brazilian adjustment came to depend upon external indebtedness 
as the only means of reconciling its inconsistencies. But there were bounds. 
As the current account threatened  to  get out of control  in  1976, when  net 
interest  payments  already  amounted  to  one-third  of  capital  inflows,  some 
domestic  restraint  became  inevitable  in  the  final  years  of  the  Geisel 
administration.  “Stop-and-go,’’  as it  was  practiced,  was  an  inelegant  and 
ultimately  ineffective solution to the problem of incomplete adjustment.  Its 286  Eliana A. Cardoso and Albert Fishlow 
limits  became apparent  in  1978 when  inflation  returned  to its higher  1976 
level despite only moderate GDP growth. 
Conventional restraint  was powerless against adverse agricultural harvests 
and rising food prices which other sectors quickly felt through the transmis- 
sion mechanism of higher wage demands.  The Brazilian system of  indexing 
was  now  operating  to the  disadvantage  of  policymakers.  It  had  helped  in 
promoting  deceleration  of  inflation  so long  as  it had  been  manipulated  to 
reduce real wages and so long as supply-side shocks exerted a positive force. 
Now, as civil society was increasingly voicing its demands, and shocks were 
adverse,  real  wages could no longer be  determined as the residual  income 
share. Instead, controls proliferated at the expense of priorities. 
As sectors and interests defended their entrenched positions,  the absolute 
level  of  subsidies  rose  without  changing  relative  incentives.  The net  tax 
burden declined even while  there was resistance to public sector encroach- 
ment.  Private  investment  decisions  were  increasingly  conditioned  on 
government  policy.  The  role  of  pure  market  forces  in  determining  the 
allocation of  resources progressively receded. 
2.4  The External Situation 
External  policy  did  not  perform  much  more  satisfactorily  than  the 
domestic  instruments.  The  exchange  rate  depreciated  only  in  line  with 
Brazilian  relative  inflation  and  not  much  more.  Larger  devaluations  were 
ruled out by the expectation that they would soon be passed along in prices 
and wages. Between  1974 and  1977, the real exchange rate moved within a 
narrow  range. Its limited  devaluation  in  1978 derives  primarily  from  the 
dollar’s  decline  relative  to  other  currencies.  Subsidies  to  manufactured 
products, excluding indirect tax exemptions permitted under GATT, did rise 
from  about  20 to 40 percent  of  their  value  over  this  period;  their  effect, 
however,  was partially offset by downward pressures on international prices 
of  Brazilian exports. 
There was thus no mechanism to assure increased incentives to penetrate 
external markets. While exports continued to grow during 1974-78,  as they 
had  done  earlier,  and  their  composition  diversified  to  include  more 
manufactured  goods,  a  decomposition  of  the  sources  of  growth  shows  a 
marked  difference  relative  to the  preceding  period.  In  1971  -74  increased 
Brazilian  competitiveness  accounted for close to half of the rise in exports; 
in  1974-78,  less than  20 percent.  Indeed, Brazilian participation  in world 
trade  remained  approximately  constant.  For  manufactured  products  exclu- 
sively, the conclusion is again telling: 71 percent is explained by competitive 
improvement in  1971-74,  but only 43 percent in  1974-78. 
A  vigorous  export  expansion  was  a  necessary  corollary  of  the  debt 
adjustment  strategy  that  had  been  followed.  Because  the  economy  was 
already so closed, additional import restrictions and substitution could make 287  BraziUChapter 2 
available only limited foreign exchange to meet the increasing debt service. 
Export growth, however, did not play its role. Debt increased on the order of 
28 percent per year between  1973 and  1978 and faster than exports.  Ever 
larger debuexport  ratios  signalled the continuing postponement of  the in- 
evitable balance of payments realignment. 
At  the  same  time,  the  real  resource  contribution  of  the  debt  was 
progressively  diminishing.  Each  dollar  of  new  borrowing  brought  less 
foreign  saving  that  could  be  applied  to  real  investment.  Growing  return 
interest  payments  reduced  the  margin  by  which  imports  could  exceed 
exports and placed more of  a burden on domestic saving to sustain the high 
rate of  investment-about  25 percent of product-that  had been attained. 
Brazil was clearly becoming more vulnerable after 1973, as its integration 
into the world  economy was  progressively more  asymmetric: its  share of 
debt far exceeded its share of  trade. Were export growth not to manage to 
keep up, or the rigid control over imports to be breached, or the debt to give 
rise  to  much  more  costly  interest  remittances,  the  balance  of  payments 
constraint  was  waiting  like  the  sword  of  Damocles.  Even  without 
deterioration of the external environment, there was a potential debt problem 
in Brazil's future. 
From table 2.1 the precarious nature of  the external adjustment after the 
first oil shock is apparent. Reduction in the current account deficit, although 
Table 2.1  The Balance of  Payments and the First Oil Shock (in  billions of U.S.  dollars) 




External effects resulting from:" 
Higher oil prices 
Reduced export volume 
Change in coffee price 
Actual medium- and long-term net debt 




0.0  -4.7  -3.5  -2.3  0.1 
-0.5  -0.7  -  1.5  -  1.8  -2.1 
-  1.7  -7.1  -6.8  -6.1  -4.0 
-2.2  -2.3  -2.9  -3.1 
-0.6  ~  1.5  -  1.4  -  1.9 
-0.1  0.  I  1.4  2.0 
6.2  11.9  17.2  19.5  24.7 
11.5  16.3  17.4  21.8 
9.5  13.3  14.1  20.7 
10.3  14.5  16.3  23.2 
*External effects were calculated by comparing actual data with results obtained by assuming that: oil prices 
were  fixed at  1973 value;  deviation  in estimated  noncoffee  export volume  was  caused  by  slower  OECD 
growth  relative  to  1968-73  average  (deviation  calculated  from  regression  for  period  1969-82  relating 
Brazilian export growth to OECD growth rate, yielding an elasticity of 2);  and coffee price was fixed at 1973 
nominal value. 
'Export increase: consequences for noncoffee export growth of a 10 percent real exchange rate devaluation, 
using  a medium-term  elasticity  of  0.6. The  latter  is  a composite  of  the  medium-term  value  of  0.75 for 
manufactured  products  and 0.5 for  nonmanufactures.  See Instituto  de Pesquisa  Economic6  Aplicada  do 
Ministerio de Planejamento (IPEA),  Perspectivas de Longo Pram du  Economia  Brasileira  (Rio de Janeiro 
1985) and Musalem (1984). Import  limits: consequences of a unitary real import elasticity, post-1973, with 
actual growth sales. Slower growth: consequences of  5 percent annual growth, 1974-77,  with actual import 
elasticity in  1974 and  1 thereafter. 288  Eliana A. Cardoso and Albert Fishlow 
continuous  after  1974, was  very  gradual;  in  1977 it  remained  $4  billion 
compared  to the  peak  $7.1  billion  in  1974. This style of  accommodation 
translated  into a rapid  intervening  accumulation  of  debt: in net  terms after 
subtraction of reserves, the external debt stood in 1977 at almost $25 billion. 
It  became  an  independent  force.  The current  account  deficit  was  large  in 
1977 even though the trade balance, helped by coffee and other commodity 
prices,  had  barely  moved  into  surplus.  An  important  reason  was  the 
mounting  interest  cost on the  debt that already explains  about  one-third of 
the increase in the net debt between  1974 and  1977. 
An adverse international economy contributed to the deficit in two ways: 
higher oil prices and slower trade growth. Of these two factors, the first was 
far  more  important.  Had  oil  prices  remained  at  their  1973 level,  Brazil’s 
actual imports  would  have cost $10.5 billion  less between  1974 and  1977; 
the increasing effect of higher oil prices  reflects the larger import  volumes 
that Brazilian policy  did little to deter.  Slower OECD growth  in  1974-77 
than  in  1968-73,  by  contrast,  penalized  export receipts  by  a  cumulative 
$5.4 billion, or less than half as much as higher oil prices cost. Against these 
negatives,  rising  coffee prices  provided  an  increasing  offset  by  1976 and 
1977, virtually eliminating the OECD effect. Indeed, overall Brazilian terms 
of trade were more favorable in  1977 than they had been in  1973. 
On balance, then, a little more than half of the addition to the net debt can 
be directly traced to external circumstances.  With the additional contribution 
of interest  service, that leaves only a small residual  in the increased debt to 
be  explained,  once  Brazil  had  opted  for  its  fuel-intensive,  high-import- 
requirement  model of  adjustment.  We can get at this issue another way, by 
asking what effect other potential  Brazilian policies would  have had on the 
net debt.  Three such policies are shown in table 2.1:  the effects on export 
growth of a real devaluation of  10 percent; less import  intensity,  such that 
real  imports  only  increased  proportionally  to  product  growth; and  slower 
product and import growth, reflecting  a more conservative  response to the 
oil shock, but taking effect only from  1975 on. 
Export  gains  would  have  had  a  modest,  but  increasing,  impact  in 
substituting  for  debt.  Cumulative  increases  in  exports  would  also  have 
improved  the  debt/export  ratio.  A  less  import-intensive  strategy,  through 
immediately  higher  costs of  fuel  and  other  inputs,  and  a  less  ambitious 
industrialization  program  would  have  reduced  debt  more,  particularly 
between  1974 and  1976 when the import elasticity remained high. 
The third  option, slowing growth to 5  percent  in  1974 but lowering the 
import elasticity only thereafter, shows the limitation of relying  on income 
effects as long as imports remained relatively  cheap in  1974, as they did. It 
is therefore not surprising that this initial policy was soon abandoned by the 
government.  Import restrictions were increasingly imposed so that by  1977 
the  actual  import elasticity  fell  below  unity;  that  is  why  the  hypothetical 
import-limit  policies  in  table  2.1 would  have  been  less effective  than  the 
actual trade barriers were in curtailing debt growth. 289  BraziUChapter 2 
These calculations make clear that an early and steady implementation of a 
combination  of  policies,  rather  than  a  single  measure,  was  necessary  to 
prevent the oil shock from unduly interrupting growth or saddling the country 
with an extensive debt. Instead,  Brazil  had  been late to react to a flood of 
imports  in  1974  and  had  then  gambled  on  an  ambitious  plan  of  import 
substitution and limited relative price change. Muddling through after  1976 
was  able to  keep  the  resulting  disequilibrium  within  bounds.  So long as 
disaster was averted, as it was, and the economy continued to grow, as it did, 
attention could continue to be directed to the delicate task of commanding the 
pace of popular participation,  which the Geisel administration did with skill. 
The new  Figueiredo  administration  was  left  to deal  with  the  incomplete 
economic adjustment problem. 
2.5  New Initiatives 
The presidential  succession  in March  1979 defined  a  new  approach  to 
economic  policy.  It  went  beyond  validation  of  just  another  episode  of 
‘  ‘stop-and-go’ ’ to  slow down accelerating  inflation  and defend  the  fragile 
balance of  payments. The guiding principles were two in number.  First, the 
role of market signals, including the exchange rate,  would be strengthened 
and controls diminished.  Second, the effectiveness of  fiscal policy would be 
enhanced by increasing the transparency of expenditure and reducing reliance 
upon  the  monetary  budget  to finance  deficits.  There was little  attempt  to 
conceal  the  probability  that  lower  growth  might  be  the  price  for  such  a 
substantial reordering of  the Brazilian economy. 
This reformist vision of Mirio Simonsen, moved from his post as Geisel’s 
finance  minister to Figueiredo’s planning  minister  and economic czar,  was 
relabeled  “recessionist”  by  its  Brazilian  critics,  who  were  numerous. 
Private entrepreneurs challenged the utility  of  looming recession when their 
profits were already under pressure.  Workers were experiencing the erosion 
of  real  wages from acelerating inflation  because  indexed  adjustments  were 
only  made  once a  year;  they  did  not  look  forward  to weaker  demand  in 
addition.  Private  banks  did  not  welcome  the  Bank  of  Brazil  competing 
directly  for prime  clients  rather  than  distributing  credit  subsidized  by  the 
Central Bank to priority sectors. 
Within  the  government,  the  new  ministers  were  eager  to  spend, not  to 
reduce,  their  expenditures  and  their  power.  There was  no lack  of  worthy 
causes. Poor agricultural harvests reinforced the case for abundant and cheap 
credit to the sector. The alcohol program was in need of new investment for 
a second, hydrated phase based on alcohol-powered  cars. State enterprises 
had  critical  projects  underway;  Petrobras,  the  state  oil  company,  in 
particular, wished to increase substantially its expenditures for exploration. 
President Figueiredo,  beset by the rise in OPEC prices  in June  1979 and 
the  need  for a  “war  economy,”  soon  yielded.  In  August,  Simonsen  was 
dismissed in favor of Antijnio Delfim Neto.  Delfim promised a supply-side 290  Eliana A. Cardoso and Albert Fishlow 
approach to mounting internal and external disequilibrium that would  make 
demand  restraint  unnecessary.  That  was  sweet  music  to  the  ears  of  a 
president  elected  because  of  his  pledge  to  wider  popular  political 
participation,  who was persuaded that prosperity was a necessary condition 
to its success. Unfortunately,  as the next chapter shows, the realization was 
much different than the expectation. 
3  Adjustment in the 1980s: From 
International Monetarism to the 
Plano Cruzado 
As our discussion has shown, Brazilian adjustment policies,  even before the 
second  oil  shock,  were  in  need  of  a  midterm  correction.  Simonsen’s 
orthodox approach was rejected  barely after its announcement and before it 
could be implemented. Delfim’s more optimistic heterodoxy was much more 
congenial. But it too proved inadequate, both because of its own limitations 
and  the  deteriorating  international  economic  environment. Brazil  by  198  1 
was in the midst of a harsh austerity program designed to compensate for its 
mounting external disequilibrium.  It could hope to succeed only if  external 
credit  were restored.  The Mexican  debt  crisis in August  1982 dashed  that 
hope and soon sent Brazil scurrying to the International Monetary Fund for 
assistance. 
The experience  with  the  IMF was  tumultuous  and  marked  by  repeated 
letters  of  intent  and  waivers  for  nonfulfilled  targets.  Improved  external 
performance  came  partially  at  the  expense  of  domestic  inflation  and 
investment objectives.  Still,  with  the large increase in exports of  manufac- 
tures in  1984, the  economy  began to show signs of recovery  and resumed 
growth. The new civilian government that took office in  1985 soon defined 
itself as committed to expansion rather than macroeconomic restraint. Ample 
reserves  made  it  possible  to  delay  any  long-term  agreement  with  private 
creditors and to allow the extended program with the Fund to lapse. 
Accelerating  growth  in  1985 was accompanied  by  accelerating  inflation 
that  threatened  the  transition  to  sustained  growth  and  provoked  popular 
discontent  and  political  dissatisfaction.  The Pluno  Cruzado,  in  February 
1986,  was  the  heterodox  response.  In  the  mold  of  similar  programs 
previously launched in Argentina and Israel, it identified inertial inflation as 
the source of inflationary rates that had already exceeded annual rates of 300 
percent.  It  was  a  bold,  and  temporarily  successful,  way  to  devise  a 
recession-free  domestic  adjustment to match that of the external  accounts. 